Iraq and the United States

The Mandate, the Kingdom, and Representation

American contacts preceded Iraqi independence. Washington appointed a consul for Ottoman Baghdad in 1888. After the First World War, Britain administered Iraq under a mandate that Washington supported while insisting on eventual independence. Recognition and resident diplomacy emerged during this transition from imperial rule to an Iraqi kingdom. [1]

Washington recognized Iraq in 1930 through a convention that acknowledged both its independence and Britain’s special position under the mandate. Formal relations and an American legation followed in 1931; Iraq established its Washington legation in 1942. Negotiations over exchanging ambassadors in 1946 again turned on precedence: the United States wanted the normal standing of an ambassador in Baghdad after Britain relinquished its privileged position. The American mission acquired embassy rank in December 1946, followed by Iraq’s Washington mission in March 1947. [1] [2] [3]

The Arab Union of Iraq and Jordan created a different problem in 1958. Washington wanted a common foreign ministry before recognizing a new state, but Jordanian Prime Minister Samir Rifai said ambassadors could not be accredited to the union until foreign affairs had been integrated. The United States nevertheless recognized the union on 28 May while retaining separate relations with Iraq and Jordan. Recognition did not produce a new American mission to the union. [1] [4]

The July 1958 revolution overthrew the Hashemite monarchy and changed the government’s international alignment. Abd al-Karim Qasim’s republic withdrew from the Baghdad Pact and widened relations with Communist states. Repeated coups followed; the Baath Party secured power in 1968. American officials now dealt with governments that challenged the kingdom’s British connection and treated Western influence with considerable suspicion. [12]

Channels during Estrangement and War

Iraq severed relations during the June 1967 Arab-Israeli war. By May 1972, it maintained a section staffed by Iraqi officials under the Indian Embassy in Washington, while Belgian diplomats and local employees handled American interests in Baghdad. In July, Iraq’s foreign ministry described two Iraqi diplomats in Washington and insisted that assigning American officers to Baghdad would leave relations severed. The American interests section opened under Belgian protection on 1 October 1972. [1] [10] [11]

Those sections sustained negotiations over communications and commerce. In April 1973, Salim Yusuf Mansoor sought advice on joining Intelsat and restoring a direct cable address to Baghdad; Edward Djerejian supplied the required documents and encouraged direct contact. Mansoor worried that his access to American officials would create demands for identical access in Baghdad. Djerejian said Washington would welcome better access but would not make Mansoor’s contacts a basis for reciprocal demands. [5]

Iraq’s invasion of Iran in 1980 created a different calculation in Washington. By November 1984, National Security Adviser Robert McFarlane described Iraq as a barrier to Iranian expansion and argued for restoring relations. His memorandum also acknowledged the regime’s repression and use of chemical weapons. The decision therefore reflected a strategic accommodation despite known abuses, alongside hopes for commercial ties and influence over regional diplomacy. [13] [14]

On 26 November 1984, Reagan and Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz agreed to restore relations. Both interests sections became embassies immediately, with their chiefs serving as chargés while ambassadors were appointed. Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait brought another breakdown: the American embassy closed on 12 January 1991, and Iraq formally severed relations on 9 February. [6] [1]

Sanctions, Invasion, and the Transfer of Authority

The 1991 war left Iraq subject to international sanctions, arms restrictions, and weapons inspections. Disputes over inspectors’ access became a recurring diplomatic confrontation during the following decade, while sanctions contributed to the deterioration of civilian living conditions. The relationship was consequently conducted largely through multilateral decisions and crisis negotiations, with little room for the commercial opening anticipated in the 1980s. [13]

The United States and Britain led the invasion of March 2003 and established the Coalition Provisional Authority after Saddam Hussein’s government fell. Claims about Iraqi weapons of mass destruction had been central to the case for war. Britain’s Iraq Inquiry later found that public statements conveyed greater certainty than the intelligence warranted and that diplomatic options had not been exhausted. [1] [15]

The 2004 restoration accompanied the transfer of sovereign authority from the Coalition Provisional Authority to the Iraqi Interim Government. Bush proposed permanent diplomatic missions effective upon that transfer, and Prime Minister Ayad Allawi confirmed agreement. Relations resumed on 28 June, followed by John Negroponte’s credentials the next day. [7] [1]

Negotiating the Military Presence and a Civilian Partnership

The governments negotiated a security agreement in 2008 requiring American forces to leave by the end of 2011. Talks over retaining a force did not resolve the question of legal protections for American personnel, and the last contingent withdrew in December 2011. A separate Strategic Framework Agreement supported continuing political, economic, and cultural cooperation through joint committees. [16]

The Islamic State’s advance brought a new Iraqi request for military support. In September 2014, Obama reported to Congress that American airstrikes and assistance to Iraqi forces were being undertaken in coordination with Baghdad and coalition partners. The assistance included training, intelligence, and communications support, including for Kurdish forces. [17]

At their April 2024 meeting, Biden and Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani placed the future of the coalition within a wider agenda. A joint military commission would assess the Islamic State threat and Iraqi capabilities before determining how the coalition mission should end and bilateral security partnerships continue. The leaders also discussed electricity links with neighboring countries, energy investment, banking reform, and trade finance. Their statement treated economic integration and respect for Iraqi sovereignty as necessary parts of the relationship, beyond the fight against a particular armed group. [18]

Related Reading

• Diplomacy after Rupture: Interests Sections and Protecting Powers
• Arab Union of Iraq and Jordan [1] [4]