The Washington Naval Conference
12 November 1921–6 February 1922
Naval Competition after the First World War
After the First World War, the United States, Britain, and Japan faced costly naval construction programs and mutual suspicions about security in the Pacific. President Warren Harding’s administration invited the principal naval powers to Washington to consider limits on armaments together with disputes in East Asia. Governments sought assurances about their rivals' Pacific commitments before agreeing to reduce their fleets. [1]
The conference opened on 12 November 1921, after delegates attended the burial of the American Unknown Soldier. Secretary of State Charles Evans Hughes chaired the proceedings. Ambassadors worked alongside cabinet ministers, naval officers, and technical advisers. Two principal committees allowed armaments and Pacific questions to proceed together, while smaller groups handled technical details and drafting. Closed committee meetings produced press communiqués and proposals for public sessions. [2]
Ships, Bases, and Competing Assurances
The Five-Power Treaty signed on 6 February 1922 limited capital ships, the large battleships and battlecruisers at the center of naval planning. It accepted a 5:5:3 ratio for the United States, British Empire, and Japan, with smaller allowances for France and Italy. Japan’s insistence on keeping the Mutsu led to compensating adjustments for the American and British fleets. [2]
Under the Four-Power Treaty, the United States, Britain, France, and Japan agreed to consult over disputes affecting their Pacific possessions, and the Anglo-Japanese alliance was brought to an end. American officials had feared that a war between Japan and the United States could draw Britain in on Japan's side. [1]
China’s Claims and the Settlement’s Limits
The Republic of China took part in the discussions of East Asian questions. The Nine-Power Treaty affirmed China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity and endorsed equal commercial opportunity. A separate Chinese-Japanese treaty of 4 February provided for restoration to China of rights and interests in Shandong, revisiting a dispute left unresolved for China at the Paris Peace Conference. Other foreign privileges in China remained. [1] [2]
The treaties left some categories of warships unrestricted and provided no effective means to enforce every commitment. Disagreement over China's future also continued. [1]
Sources
- The Washington Naval Conference, 1921–1922
Naval competition, the three treaty frameworks, China, and limits of enforcement
- Report of the American Delegation, 9 February 1922
FRUS 1922, Volume I, document 88; opening, Organization and Procedure, Treaties and Resolutions, and capital-ship agreement at pages 323–325
Related Reading
Cite This Article
The Washington Naval Conference. Chanceries Diplopedia. Record e21bdabd51bd54b7d968. https://chanceries.org/research/history/washington-naval-conference-1921/