Japan and the United States

Treaties and Resident Representation

American and Japanese recognition followed the Treaty of Kanagawa in 1854. The Treaty of Amity and Commerce established diplomatic relations in 1858, and Townsend Harris presented credentials as American minister in 1859. Japan’s visiting delegation of 1860 preceded its resident representation in Washington: the Meiji government sent Arinori Mori as chargé d’affaires, and he served from 1871 to 1873. [1] [2] [3] [4]

The Iwakura mission attempted to revise Japan’s treaties during its Washington stay in 1872. Secretary of State Hamilton Fish questioned whether its members possessed authority to sign a new agreement. Itō Hirobumi and Ōkubo Toshimichi returned to Japan to obtain full powers, while Mori supported the effort. Their return did not close the gap over treaty terms. Eleven rounds of talks ended without agreement on jurisdiction and tariffs. [5]

Pacific Agreements and Unequal Treatment

Japan’s Washington legation became an embassy in January 1906, when Aoki Shūzō was appointed ambassador. The American mission in Tokyo followed in May. Japan’s Foreign Ministry had debated embassy rank during the 1890s, but exchanges became possible after the Russo-Japanese War, when Britain and the United States indicated that they were ready to send ambassadors. [4] [1]

At Secretary of State Charles Evans Hughes’s home in December 1921, Ambassador Kijūrō Shidehara questioned a proposed Pacific agreement with Britain, France, and the United States. Its geographical scope troubled him: Japan’s home islands might be covered while the American mainland remained outside it. He also wanted to protect the possibility of arbitration before a conference was summoned. Hughes assured him that ordinary diplomacy included arbitration, and Shidehara withdrew that proposed amendment. [7]

The Four-Power Treaty signed in Washington on December 13 provided for consultation over disputes affecting Pacific insular possessions and dominions. It replaced the Anglo-Japanese alliance when ratifications were deposited and included a declaration excluding disputes confined to domestic jurisdiction. Its commitments rested on conference and communication; they did not prescribe an automatic military response. [8]

Immigration soon tested the relationship more directly. In April 1924, Ambassador Masanao Hanihara defended Japan’s voluntary restrictions under the Gentlemen’s Agreement and protested legislation that would exclude Japanese immigrants through racial restrictions on eligibility for citizenship. He presented the issue as one of national standing. Hughes accepted his explanation of the existing arrangement, but senators interpreted Hanihara’s warning about damaged relations as a threat. The State Department’s attempt to preserve the agreement lost congressional support. The exclusion provision became law despite Japan’s protest. [9] [10] [11] [12]

The Failure of the Washington Negotiations

By November 1941, negotiators in Washington faced incompatible demands over Japan’s military position in China and Indochina. Secretary of State Cordell Hull handed Ambassador Kichisaburō Nomura and special envoy Saburō Kurusu an outline on November 26 that proposed Japanese withdrawal from China and Indochina and an end to support for Chinese governments other than Chiang Kai-shek’s. In return, it envisaged new commercial negotiations, removal of asset freezes, and financial cooperation. Its heading described a tentative basis for agreement. The proposed settlement required changes in Japanese policy well beyond the temporary accommodation the envoys had sought. [13] [14]

According to the American memorandum, Kurusu objected that Japan could not accept the proposed position on China and asked whether the response meant an end to discussion. Hull stressed the political opposition to supplying oil while Japanese forces remained in Indochina. Nomura asked to see President Franklin Roosevelt, and the diplomats arranged further contact over details. Negotiations continued without bridging the disagreement. Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbor was followed by formal severance on December 8. American ambassador Joseph Grew and his staff remained in Japan, including a period of internment, before departing in June 1942. [14] [1]

Restoration and the Terms of an Alliance

Normal diplomatic relations resumed on April 28, 1952, when the peace treaty took effect and the Allied occupation ended. Japanese chargé Ryūji Takeuchi presented his credentials in Washington that day, and the governments exchanged ratifications of their first security treaty. The American embassy in Tokyo reopened when Robert Murphy presented his credentials on May 9. [1]

The security treaty signed in Washington on January 19, 1960, gave the restored relationship a new defense framework. It provided for consultation over threats to Japan’s security, permitted American use of facilities in Japan, and committed each government to act through its constitutional processes if either was attacked in territory under Japanese administration. It replaced the earlier security treaty once ratifications were exchanged. [6]

The 1960 agreement also provided a means of terminating it. After ten years, either government could give notice of termination, effective a year later. Its signatories included Prime Minister Nobusuke Kishi and Ambassador Kōichirō Asakai for Japan, and Secretary of State Christian Herter for the United States. [6]

Sovereignty, Markets, and the Work of an Alliance

The alliance required continuing negotiation over territory and economic interests. In November 1969, Prime Minister Satō Eisaku and Nixon discussed returning Okinawa to Japanese administration while also confronting American demands over textile exports. Satō directed Ambassador Shimoda and other officials to continue the commercial talks; both leaders worried about domestic opposition and public presentation. Their January 1972 statement fixed 15 May for Okinawa’s return and promised further consultation over American bases. [15] [16]

Japan’s economic rise made market access and trade imbalances prominent disputes during the 1980s and early 1990s. Those tensions later eased, although negotiations continued over automobiles, agriculture, and other sectors; limited trade and digital agreements took effect in 2020. The alliance also developed a practical humanitarian role. Following the earthquake and tsunami of March 2011, American and Japanese forces worked together in Operation Tomodachi, moving personnel and supplies into devastated areas. [17]

Security and Technology in the Twenty First Century

At their April 2024 summit, Biden and Kishida connected regional security to the countries’ industrial and technological relationship. They directed defence and foreign ministries to develop closer command coordination and announced cooperation on defence production. Alongside these measures, they promoted research in artificial intelligence, quantum technology, and semiconductors, with investment and university partnerships supporting the agenda. [18]

Related Reading

• Pearl Harbor and the End of U.S.–Japan Negotiations [1]
• The 1960 U.S.–Japan Security Treaty and Protests [6]
• Hanihara’s Immigration Protest Reaches Congress [9]
• Japan and the United States Resume Diplomatic Relations [1]