Mediators and Messengers in Washington Crises

A diplomatic message can open negotiations only if its recipient understands whom the messenger represents and what that government is prepared to do. During crises, Washington has used outside mediators, assurances from accredited ambassadors, and private exchanges alongside public statements. The ABC mediation, the Arabic dispute, and the Cuban missile crisis illustrate different uses of these channels, as well as the difficulty of turning an assurance into an accepted settlement. [3] [8] [1]

Mediation by Other Governments

Argentina, Brazil, and Chile offered good offices during the crisis over the American occupation of Veracruz in 1914. Their representatives, known collectively as the ABC mediators, brought American and Mexican delegates to Niagara Falls in Canada. At the opening session on 20 May, Domício da Gama and Rómulo Sebastián Naón proposed private conversations to prepare understandings for formal meetings; Eduardo Suárez Mujica joined the next recorded session. [3]

American delegates maintained their refusal to recognize Victoriano Huerta’s government, while the mediators sought participation from the Constitutionalist side. Huerta fell in July and American forces left Veracruz in November. [3] [5] [6]

Negotiating an Authorized Assurance

After a German submarine sank the liner Arabic in 1915, Johann Heinrich von Bernstorff had to convey Berlin’s response to Washington. On 1 September, he reported instructions against sinking liners without warning and provision for civilian safety, subject to exceptions for escape or resistance. [4]

Berlin subsequently disavowed the attack as contrary to the commander’s instructions and authorized Bernstorff to negotiate compensation for American lives lost. Robert Lansing accepted those assurances on 6 October and undertook to obtain information from claimants. [7] [8]

Public Offers and Confidential Exchanges

In October 1962, President Kennedy publicly offered to end the quarantine of Cuba and give assurances against invasion in return for removal of Soviet missile bases and safeguards. On 27 October, Robert Kennedy met Anatoly Dobrynin at the Justice Department and pressed for an immediate Soviet commitment. [9] [1]

The confidential part concerned American missiles in Turkey. Dobrynin’s cable reported an assurance that they could be withdrawn within four or five months, accompanied by a warning against public disclosure. Robert Kennedy’s later memorandum rejected a direct bargain and referred to NATO’s authority; a sentence mentioning the four or five month interval was crossed out in its surviving draft. Khrushchev’s private reply nevertheless referred to the assurance received through Dobrynin. [2] [1] [10] [11]