Moussa Al-Shabandar

Moussa Al-Shabandar represented Iraq in Washington while also returning to cabinet office in Baghdad. He presented ambassadorial credentials in September 1953 and served as foreign minister during two periods in 1954. Before his Washington posting, he attended Dulles’s 18 May 1953 meeting with Iraq’s leaders in Baghdad as ambassador-designate, where the Iraqi ministers linked cooperation with the West to Palestine, regional security, and development. ^{1, 2, 4}

In July 1954, Shabandar accompanied Foreign Minister Fadhil Jamali to Washington discussions about American arms supplies and a regional defense system. Dulles emphasized that U.S. military aid must not be used against Israel and urged Iraq to associate itself with the Turkey–Pakistan pact. Jamali sought conspicuous early deliveries of American equipment to help the government secure domestic support. ⁵

During the Suez crisis, Shabandar pressed the United States to act beyond its condemnation of the attacks on Egypt. At a 3 November 1956 meeting with Under Secretary Herbert Hoover Jr., he joined the ambassadors of Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, and Tunisia. He asked what Washington would do if the belligerents ignored the United Nations ceasefire resolution, advocated diplomatic and economic sanctions through the UN, and warned that Arab governments could not indefinitely restrain their populations. Hoover declined to promise unilateral American intervention and insisted that action remain within the UN. ³

Three weeks later, Shabandar described the collapse of British and French prestige as an opening for a stronger American role. He told Assistant Secretary William Rountree on 26 November that Iraq wanted U.S. military and political support, while his armed forces attaché, Hassan Mustapha, specified requests for modern aircraft, training, and antiaircraft equipment. Shabandar also argued that any Palestine initiative should begin from the 1947 UN resolutions and offered to sound out Arab leaders in New York. Rountree welcomed closer cooperation but urged Iraq to retain its British supply relationship. Additional aid remained under consideration by senior American officials. ⁶