Turkey and the United States

Imperial Relations and the Republic

American relations with the Ottoman Empire developed through commercial negotiations before permanent representation. The American negotiating delegation’s reception in February 1830 supplied the formal act of mutual recognition; David Porter’s credentials on 13 September 1831 established diplomatic relations and the American legation in Constantinople. Representation in the opposite direction developed later: the Turkish embassy’s historical roster begins with an Ottoman representative in 1867. The United States raised its own mission to embassy rank in 1906. [1] [2]

The Ottoman government severed relations on 20 April 1917. Restoration in 1927 required negotiators to resolve whether diplomatic relations depended on a broader treaty settlement. Secretary of State Frank Kellogg maintained that they did not, but authorized an exchange of notes to accommodate the Turkish position. The reciprocal notes signed at Ankara on 17 February committed the two governments to diplomatic and consular relations, reciprocal treatment of representatives, and the appointment of ambassadors. They also set out a framework for later commercial, residence, and consular agreements. Thus relations could resume while the wider treaty questions remained unsettled. Turkey’s Foreign Ministry identifies this exchange as the beginning of relations between the United States and the republic. [1] [3] [4] [5] [6]

The Cold War Alliance

The security partnership grew out of the unsettled years after the Second World War. Soviet pressure over the Turkish Straits and Britain’s inability to sustain assistance led Ankara to seek American support. Truman’s March 1947 request to Congress included aid for Turkey as well as Greece. The resulting commitment helped shift the relationship from restored diplomatic contact toward sustained military and economic cooperation. [10]

Turkey’s entry into NATO in February 1952 placed bilateral military cooperation within an alliance, but did not remove disputes over its terms. Following Turkey’s military intervention in Cyprus, Congress imposed an arms embargo in 1975. Ankara challenged the validity of the defense cooperation agreement and suspended American operations at facilities outside direct NATO defense activities. A replacement agreement signed in March 1976 required implementing legislation that Congress did not enact. The embargo ended in September 1978, and Turkey authorized a transitional resumption of suspended operations from October while a new agreement was negotiated. [7] [8] [9] [2]

Regional Wars and Limits on Cooperation

The 1980 Defence and Economic Cooperation Agreement renewed the institutional basis of military cooperation. Turkey allowed coalition aircraft to use its bases and airspace during the 1991 Gulf War and subsequent operations over northern Iraq, and later joined the international force in Afghanistan. In March 2003, however, its parliament refused permission for American ground forces to deploy through Turkey against Iraq. Negotiations then secured airspace access and logistical cooperation. [11] [12]

The Syrian war exposed another divergence when Washington supported forces led by Kurdish fighters against the Islamic State and Ankara regarded their links to the PKK as a security threat. Turkey’s purchase of Russian S-400 air defences in 2019 led to removal from the F-35 programme and American sanctions in 2020. Cooperation nevertheless continued: after Turkey approved Sweden’s NATO accession in January 2024, Washington advanced an F-16 sale, with an offer accepted that June. [11] [13]

Trade, Energy, and Public Exchanges

The March 2024 Strategic Mechanism meeting placed these disputes within a wider agenda. Ministers discussed trade and investment, energy security, climate, and civilian nuclear cooperation. They also supported educational and cultural exchanges. [14]