Negotiating through Washington’s Institutions
Finding the Authority to Decide
Foreign representatives in Washington negotiated with departments, Congress, courts, and the president. The State Department could receive a demand, while another institution controlled the tariff, interpreted a tax law, or authorized an arms sale. [1] [2] [3]
Treaty Promises and Customs Law
Jules Cambon argued that a commercial agreement signed with John Kasson in May 1898 required a lower American tariff on French liqueurs and cordials. Customs officials in New York continued charging the higher rate. Cambon invoked the agreement’s language and the concessions calculated during negotiations; embassy secretary Eugène Thiébaut also presented the case at Treasury. [4] [5] [6]
In the French case, Treasury Secretary Lyman Gage treated the tariff provision specifically naming cordials and liqueurs as controlling over the general provision for spirits. Secretary of State William Day adopted that reasoning in July and pointed France toward judicial appeal. [6] [1]
Tax Relief and the Limits of Retroactivity
Canada had amended its shipping tax law before Vincent Massey approached Washington in May 1928. Treasury then distinguished citizens from residents and considered where companies were registered. Exempting a Canadian citizen living in the United States raised different legal questions from exempting qualifying earnings of a Canadian shipping business. [7] [2]
By September 1928, the United States accepted relief for specified shipping earnings, including ferry operations, reaching back to 1921 while keeping statutory limits on refunds. H. H. Wrong replied that Canada would instruct its revenue authorities and considered the exchange of notes sufficient to record the agreement. [8] [9]
Arms Sales and Presidential Decisions
In July 1962, Avraham Harman led a presentation stressing Israel’s vulnerability to aircraft flying at low altitude. Dean Rusk later recommended making Hawk air defense missiles available if an attempt at regional arms limitation failed. He also wanted to preserve American relationships with Arab governments and avoid creating a special military alliance. [10] [3]
On 19 August, presidential adviser Myer Feldman told David Ben-Gurion in Israel that Kennedy had decided to make the missiles available. The assurance reached the prime minister through a presidential emissary, after the embassy’s Washington presentations. Price, delivery, and other details still needed agreement. [11] [3]
Further Reading
- Cambon Disputes the Tariff on French Liqueurs. Read the competing interpretations of one commercial concession before comparing the later tax accommodation. [5] [1]
- Canada and the United States Agree on Tax Relief for Shipping. Follow the distinctions between residence, nationality, and shipping income that made a reciprocal agreement possible. [2] [8]
- Harman Argues Israel's Case for Air Defense Missiles. Compare a presidential arms decision with the legal constraints in the two commercial cases. [3] [11]
Sources
- William R. Day to Jules Cambon, 25 July 1898
FRUS 1898, pp. 304–306, adoption of Treasury’s interpretation and concluding judicial appeal.
- State Department to the Canadian minister, 29 June 1928
FRUS 1928, vol. II, pp. 1–3; file 811.512342 Shipping/14.
- Dean Rusk to President Kennedy, 7 August 1962
FRUS 1961–1963, vol. XVIII, document 14, covering recommendation and enclosure, Military Relationship.
- Commercial agreement between the United States and France, 28 May 1898
FRUS 1898, commercial agreement, Article II, English and French texts; effective 1 June 1898.
- Jules Cambon to William R. Day, 9 June 1898
FRUS 1898, pp. 298–300, Cambon’s wording and concession calculations.
- Lyman Gage to William R. Day, 13 July 1898
FRUS 1898, pp. 302–304, tariff paragraphs 289 and 292 and Thiébaut’s Treasury presentation.
- Vincent Massey to Frank B. Kellogg, 8 May 1928
FRUS 1928, vol. II, p. 1; file 811.512342 Shipping/11.
- State Department to H. H. Wrong, 17 September 1928
FRUS 1928, vol. II, pp. 6–7; file 811.512342 Shipping/19, undertakings 1–3.
- H. H. Wrong to the secretary of state, 29 September 1928
FRUS 1928, vol. II, p. 7; file 811.512342 Shipping/20.
- State Department to the Embassy in Israel, 18 July 1962
FRUS 1961–1963, vol. XVIII, document 6, opening and editorial note 1 on the 17 July presentation.
- Myer Feldman’s report from Tel Aviv, 19 August 1962
FRUS 1961–1963, vol. XVIII, document 24, telegram 180, pp. 64–66.
Notes
- This comparison follows three requests with surviving exchanges about American decision making. It is not a survey of negotiations by every foreign mission, and it does not rank diplomatic effectiveness. [1] [8] [11]
- The French and Canadian cases include their representatives’ correspondence. The Israeli case is reconstructed from American reports of Israeli presentations and American internal deliberations. Those records support the sequence described, but cannot by themselves measure the embassy’s influence or fully reconstruct Israeli deliberations. [5] [7] [9] [10] [3]
Cite This Article
Negotiating through Washington’s Institutions. Chanceries Diplopedia. Record version aa5f7e013deb0cf0aa8a.