Israel and the United States

Partition, Refugees, and Recognition

The relationship began amid the end of British rule in Palestine and the displacement left by the Holocaust. President Harry Truman pressed Britain to admit Jewish survivors from European displaced persons camps. In 1947, the United Nations proposed partition into Jewish and Arab states. Jewish leaders accepted the plan; Arab leaders rejected it. Recognition in 1948 therefore involved the unresolved future of a territory with competing national claims. [9]

Truman’s statement of 14 May 1948 recognized Israel’s provisional government as the new state’s de facto authority. The two governments agreed in June to exchange special representatives: Eliahu Epstein headed Israel’s mission in Washington, and James McDonald headed the American mission in Israel. These appointments established official channels before the exchange of ambassadors. [1] [2]

After Israel’s January 1949 election, the White House extended de jure recognition on 31 January. Agreement to establish embassies followed on 25 February. Epstein, now known as Eliahu Elath, presented ambassadorial credentials to Truman on 11 April. [3] [4] [5]

Statehood also brought a refugee crisis that remained central to American diplomacy. During the 1947–49 conflict, approximately 750,000 Palestinians were expelled or fled their homes. Israel prevented their return. Washington supported international conciliation and the creation of UNRWA to provide relief, while disputes over return and resettlement persisted. [10]

Security Disagreements Negotiated through the Embassy

In February 1957, Ambassador Abba Eban and Minister Reuven Shiloah discussed withdrawal from the Sinai and Gaza with Secretary John Foster Dulles after the Suez war. Eban retreated from demands for formal guarantees over passage through the Strait of Tiran and explored less binding assurances, United Nations arrangements, and declarations about shipping. [6]

War and the Growth of Security Cooperation

American military support expanded during the 1960s as Washington sought to counter Soviet arms supplies to Arab states. Tank and aircraft sales preceded the June 1967 war, in which Israel occupied Sinai, Gaza, the West Bank, East Jerusalem, and the Golan Heights. The Johnson administration sought a ceasefire and then supported negotiations linking withdrawal to peace and recognition. Security Council Resolution 242 established a diplomatic framework whose disputed interpretation would occupy American and Israeli officials for decades. [11]

The October 1973 war made the connection between military assistance and negotiation especially clear. Egypt and Syria attacked Israeli forces in Sinai and the Golan Heights; Israel requested urgent American resupply. Nixon authorized an airlift while the Soviet Union supplied the Arab armies. American and Soviet officials also negotiated a ceasefire through the United Nations. Washington’s growing role as Israel’s principal arms supplier thus developed alongside efforts to end the fighting and negotiate disengagement. [12]

American Mediation and the Egyptian Peace Treaty

Carter’s mediation at Camp David in September 1978 produced frameworks for an Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty and further regional negotiations. The documents invited American participation in implementation talks. When Egypt and Israel signed their peace treaty in Washington on 26 March 1979, Carter witnessed the agreement; the parties undertook to end their state of war through ratification and to establish normal relations alongside Israeli withdrawal. A joint letter confirmed an American role in subsequent negotiations concerning the West Bank and Gaza. [7] [8]

Palestinian Negotiations and Regional Recognition

The end of the Cold War opened another diplomatic track. Secret Israeli–Palestinian negotiations in Norway produced the 1993 Oslo declaration, whose signing the Clinton administration hosted in Washington. It provided for interim Palestinian self-government while postponing final decisions on borders, Jerusalem, and refugees. American officials subsequently mediated implementation disputes, including the Hebron and Wye agreements. The July 2000 Camp David summit failed to settle the remaining questions. The process created new negotiating channels and Palestinian institutions, but it did not resolve the conflict. [13]

Israel’s diplomatic relations with Arab states also widened beyond the Egyptian peace. In September 2020, Israel and the United Arab Emirates signed a normalization treaty in Washington, witnessed by President Donald Trump. It provided for ambassadors and cooperation in trade, transport, health, and other fields. [14]

Economic Cooperation and the Limits of Partnership

The relationship acquired a substantial civilian economic structure. The 1985 free trade agreement progressively removed customs duties, although agricultural barriers remained a subject of negotiation. Joint industrial and scientific research programs linked businesses, universities, and public funding agencies. [15]

Security assistance nevertheless remained a central commitment. A memorandum signed in 2016 set out annual American military financing and joint missile defence support for fiscal years 2019–28, subject to congressional appropriations. Such arrangements provided a predictable framework for cooperation without removing political disagreements or Congress’s oversight of weapons transfers. [16]

Hamas’s attacks on Israel on 7 October 2023 and the ensuing war in Gaza intensified those tensions. The Biden administration supported Israel militarily while pressing its government over civilian harm and humanitarian access. In August 2024, the United States, Egypt, and Qatar jointly called for renewed negotiations on a ceasefire and the release of hostages and detainees. [16] [17]

Related Reading

• Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty Signed in Washington [8] [7]